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Rethinking the Doctrine of Aboriginal
Rights: The Métis Cases
PAUL CHARTRAND*
The 2003 Powley judicial discovery and recognition of a new “Métis” community far from
the Métis Nation homeland usurped the historic prerogative of the executive to recognize a
new Aboriginal people and is not warranted by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 which
contemplates political negotiations. The invention of a distinct test for proof of Métis rights
was unnecessary and created doctrinal uncertainty and unfairness. This article reflects on
changes to Aboriginal rights doctrine that would limit the judicial role to the determination
of the local rights of local communities, while recognizing that the determination of national
interests and rights ought to be left to constitutionally-mandated negotiations between
Canada and each Aboriginal nation or people. A fair doctrine would adopt one date instead of
the current three dates for proof of the various rights of any and all the Aboriginal peoples,
without regard to their particular self-naming practices.

*

Paul LAH Chartrand, Professor of Law (retired), counsel to the frm DDWest LLP, formerly
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SECTION 35 OF THE Constitution Act, 1982 recognized and afrmed the existing
Aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada.1 Te Aboriginal
peoples were listed as including the Indian, Métis, and Inuit peoples. Te text
of the new constitutional provision raised fundamental questions. What are
the constitutional and legal efects of afrmation and recognition? Who are the
“Aboriginal peoples”?2 What are their existing “rights”? Who is to decide: the
politicians or the judges?
Tese questions were meant to be resolved in political negotiations and by
constitutional means. It was the politicians who were to decide. A series of national
constitutional meetings in the 1980s between federal and provincial leaders and
heads of national Aboriginal organizations failed to resolve them.3 Te questions
were generally ignored in these conferences.4 In consequence, there is an emerging
doctrine of Aboriginal rights based on the judicial interpretation of section 35.
In 2003, the Supreme Court of Canada decided R v Powley, a case in which
the judges discovered and recognized a Métis community in Ontario that had not
1.

2.
3.
4.

Constitution Act, 1982, s 35, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982,
c 11 [Constitution Act, 1982]. Section 35 provides: “(1) Te existing aboriginal and treaty
rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and afrmed. (2) In this
Act, ‘aboriginal peoples of Canada’ includes the Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada”
(ibid). Te French language version of section 35 provides: “(1) Les droits existants—
ancestraux ou issus de traités—des peuples autochtones du Canada sont reconnus et
confrmés.” Section 57 of the Act provides that “the English and French versions of this Act
are equally authoritative” (ibid, s 57).
See Paul LAH Chartrand, ed, Who Are Canada’s Aboriginal Peoples? Recognition, Defnition
and Jurisdiction, (Purich, 2002) [Chartrand, Recognition].
Harry W Daniels, “Foreword” in Chartrand, Recognition, supra note 2 at 11-14.
Ibid. I participated in the conferences as an advisor.
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been previously recognized by the Crown.5 I suggest that the recognition of an
“Aboriginal people” or nation is the prerogative of the executive, as it has always
been, and is not within judicial authority. I also suggest that the doctrine as
being developed in Métis cases following Powley is fundamentally fawed. I ofer
alternative approaches for refection. I begin by describing two main propositions,
which I ofer tentatively because they imply fundamental changes to the judicial
approach to state–Indigenous relations. I will then provide a general overview
of these points.
First, the recognition of an Aboriginal nation, or the defnition of the nation’s
rights, are not within the subject-matters open to judicial interpretation. Canada
as a state is characterized by the presence of historic and recent “nations within”—
products of political evolution exemplifed by the historic and recent evolution
of the Métis Nation and the Québécois Nation, respectively. If judges can decide
the rights of the former, then why would they not be able to decide the rights of
the latter? Te identifcation of the interests and rights of a nation, whether an
Aboriginal nation or otherwise, is the prerogative of the nation to decide, as was
contemplated in the constitutional reform meetings of the 1970s–1990s.
Te 1992 Charlottetown Accord included a Métis Nation Accord, the result
of political negotiations with political actors.6 Te now spent section 37 of the
Constitution Act, 1982 required negotiations between political representatives to
determine the rights and interests of all the Aboriginal peoples in section 35.7 Te
recognition of distinct nations—whether foreign nations or domestic Aboriginal
nations—has always been an exercise of the royal prerogative exercised by the
executive arm of government, not by the judiciary.
Tis proposition may invite the response that Aboriginal nations need the
leverage of court decisions to counter the great imbalance of political power
between them and the Canadian governments. In reply, the jurisprudence has
established a fundamental constitutional principle that consent is the basis
of constitutional legitimacy. Accordingly, Canada has, in certain conditions,
a constitutional obligation to negotiate or to implement the terms of an agreement
or treaty with an Aboriginal nation.

5.
6.

7.

2003 SCC 43 [Powley].
See Consensus Report on the Constitution: Final Text, Charlottetown (28 August 1992),
online (pdf ): <www.sqrc.gouv.qc.ca/documents/positions-historiques/positions-du-qc/
part3/Document27_en.pdf> [perma.cc/48CX-GCAW] [Charlottetown Accord]; Ibid,
s 56 [Métis Nation Accord]. A discussion of the Métis Nation Accord will be found on pages
179-80, below.
See Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 1, ss 35, 37.
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Te second proposition is this. Te judicial discovery and recognition of a
new “Métis people” that had not previously been recognized by the executive in
Powley is a seismic constitutional shift that is inappropriate for the judicial branch.
Te new tests for Aboriginal rights that were developed for this unprecedented
judicial discovery are not only unnecessary, but they have also created uncertainty
and unfairness in the emerging doctrine of Aboriginal rights that afect all
Aboriginal peoples or nations.
Tis article will argue that these results could have been avoided by the
judicial adoption of one date instead of the current three dates for proof of three
categories of Aboriginal rights. Tat approach would also have made irrelevant
the self-naming practices of the various Aboriginal peoples listed in section
35. In other words, it would not matter whether the claimant group identifed
itself as Inuit, Métis, or Indian. Self-identifcation is an aspect of the right of
self-determination. It is an internal political matter, not an issue for judicial
determination. Tere should be one test for proof of Aboriginal rights for all
Aboriginal communities.
Here it is important to distinguish between the local communities that claim
Aboriginal rights and the larger national communities or “peoples,” the rights
of which are not justiciable, as suggested in the frst proposition. Te current
judicial doctrine should be limited to the identifcation of the rights of small
communities, as established by the jurisprudence to date, and leave national
rights to be determined in a political process where the judicial role is limited
to requiring Canada to negotiate with an Aboriginal nation in good faith. Te
aggregation of the small local communities into national units is an exercise of
self-determination, not a matter for judicial determination.
Turning to the case of the Métis Nation, both constitutional and
political history compel the view that Louis Riel’s “Manitoba Treaty,” that
led to the enactment of section 31 of the Manitoba Act, 1870,8 demands the

8.

Manitoba Act, 1870, SC 1870, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II [Manitoba Act]. Te
Manitoba Act is part of the “Constitution of Canada” as provided in Constitution Act, 1982,
supra note 1, s 52(2).
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true reconciliation of Canadian and Métis interests in legitimate negotiations
and agreement.9

I. THE CHALLENGE OF RECOGNIZING ABORIGINAL
“PEOPLES” OR “NATIONS”
In Powley, the Court expressly left open the question of defning “the Métis
people” in section 35, limiting the application of its decision to the small
community identifed by the facts pleaded in that case.10 Tis approach was based
on the established jurisprudence in which Aboriginal rights were described as sui
generis rights held by relatively small communities because these rights could only
be described legally in light of specifc facts pertinent to the claimant group:11
Claims to aboriginal title are woven with history, legend, politics and moral
obligations. If the claim of any Band in respect of any particular land is to be decided
as a justiciable issue and not a political issue, it should be so considered on the facts
pertinent to that Band and to that land, and not on any global basis.

Te emerging doctrine12 of Aboriginal rights has established the law that
section 35 rights are held by the community.13 Recent case law has demonstrated
the challenge of identifying the relevant rights-holding community, particularly
in those cases where claimants argued for judicial determination of the rights of
larger communities.14
It is suggested here that this challenge seems to be beyond the competence
and the legitimate authority of the courts to determine. Tis is a question of
justiciability, asking whether the courts ought to decide or whether the decisions
9.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

It is beyond the scope of this article to review the very complex and disputed constitutional
and legal history of Canada–Métis relations. For interested readers, see Paul LAH Chartrand,
Manitoba’s Métis Settlement Scheme of 1870 (Native Law Centre, 1991) [Chartrand,
Settlement]. See also Gerhard J Ens & Joe Sawchuk, From New Peoples to New Nations: Aspects
of Métis History and Identity from the Eighteenth to Twenty-First Centuries (University of
Toronto Press, 2016) (providing a useful review and analysis and contains many references to
the large body of literature on the subject).
Powley, supra note 5 at para 12.
Kruger v R, [1978] 1 SCR 104 at 109, Dickson J [Kruger]. See also R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2
SCR 507 [Van der Peet]; Powley, supra note 5.
For present purposes, I use the term “doctrine” of Aboriginal rights to refer to the principles
from the decided cases. See Brian Slattery, “Making Sense of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights”
(2000) 79 Can Bar Rev 196 at 198-205 [Slattery, “Making Sense”].
It is an open question whether there are section 35 rights that are held by persons.
See e.g. Bernard v R, 2017 NBCA 48 [Bernard]. Te issue is considered in the text
accompanying note 51, below.
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are within the exclusive authority of the executive and legislative branches.
History and precedent stand against the view that section 35’s purpose is to
shift state authority to recognize Aboriginal peoples from the executive to the
judicial branch.
Te view adumbrated here is that the rights of an Aboriginal nation can
only be identifed by agreement as a result of political negotiations between the
legitimate political representatives of the state and of the Aboriginal nation.
Both the historic and the modern treaties involve this type of process. Further,
the political process of national constitutional talks between Aboriginal and
government representatives did reach agreement in the case of the Métis Nation
Accord, on a defensible distinction between the legal category of “Métis persons”
on one hand and the “Métis Nation” on the other hand.
A. SECTION 35 “PEOPLES” AND “NATIONS”

For present purposes, and in the absence of judicial or other compelling
authority, the term “nation” will, as is commonly done, be used as a synonym
for the collective term “people.”15 Canada has a long history of competing
nationalisms, particularly involving French and English nationalism. Te rise of
the Métis Nation in the West and its tumultuous relationship with Canada is
well-known history.16
I adopt the model of civic nationalism as opposed to the ethnic model that
has motivated the courts in the Métis cases. Te general purpose of the approach
is described by Val Napoleon in an article dealing with First Nations:17

15. See Jürgen Habermas, Te Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Teory, ed by Ciaran
Cronin & Pablo De Greif (MIT Press, 1998) at 107.
16. See e.g. Marcel Giraud, Te Métis in the Canadian West, translated by George Woodcock
(University of Alberta Press, 1986); WL Morton, Manitoba: Te Birth of a Province (DW
Friesen & Sons, 1965); Ens & Sawchuk, supra note 9; WL Morton, Manitoba: A History
(University of Toronto Press, 1967); Jacqueline Peterson & Jennifer SH Brown, eds, Te New
Peoples: Being and Becoming Métis in North America (University of Manitoba Press, 1985);
John E Foster, “Wintering, the Outsider Adult Male and the Ethnogenesis of the Western
Plains Métis” in Teodore Binnema, Gerhard J Ens, & RC Macleod, eds, From Rupert’s Land
to Canada (University of Alberta Press, 2001), 179; DN Sprague, “Government Lawlessness
in the Administration of Manitoba Land Claims, 1870–1887” (1980) 10 Man LJ 415;
DN Sprague, Canada and the Métis, 1869–1885 (Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1988).
17. “Extinction by Number: Colonialism Made Easy” (2001) 16 CJLS 113 at 114 (it is beyond
the scope of this article to review the ethnic nationalist views about Métis people and other
Aboriginal nations). See also Ernest Renan, What Is a Nation? and Other Political Writings,
translated by MFN Giglioli (Columbia University Press, 2018).
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[A]n inclusive civic model of nationhood will enable First Nations to rebuild and
maintain their political strength and integrity by moving far beyond establishing
their boundaries and internal identity on blood and ethnicity.

B. THE MÉTIS NATION IN RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY

Te civic nationalism model was adopted by the Métis National Council from the
time of its creation in response to the enactment of section 35:18
[T]he Métis nation has already incorpo-rated people other than direc [sic]
descendants of the Red River, such as half-breed people and people who have moved
and become incorporated; [T]hey have become part of the Métis nation.

Tis model fts the historical and contemporary facts where signifcant
distinctions in language as well as historical and contemporary experience exist
between the various communities that have identifed historically, and that
identify today, as Métis communities in the West. Salient examples include the
Francophone descendants of the original Métis families in southern Manitoba, the
Cree-speaking communities of northern Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta,
and the relatively isolated communities in Manitoba whose historical tradition is
more closely associated with the Ojibwa and the Nehiyapwat Confederacy. All of
them demonstrate an attachment to a common history of sufering at the hands
of the Canadian state, and focus on symbolic historical events such as the early
antagonisms with British settlers of the early nineteenth century, the events out
of which the province of Manitoba was created, and the Battle at Batoche on the
South Saskatchewan River in 1885. Te key historical characters include Louis
Riel, “the Father of Manitoba,” and Gabriel Dumont, the legend whose life has
inspired Canadians beyond the Métis community.
Tese factors are often used to construct an ethnic model of Métis
nationalism. Te ethnic model, however, faces the challenge that, as a matter of
legal history, Canada unilaterally imposed its own understanding and defnition
of “Half-breed”19 or “Métis” persons in implementing the Manitoba Act land
settlement scheme in section 31, as well as the “Half-breed” lands and scrip

18. Canada, Senate, Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Afairs, “Second
proceedings on the subject-matter of the Constitution Amendment Proclamation, 1983,”
32-1, No 70 (8 September 1983) at 84.
19. Te author considers that the term “Half-breed” is a racist term that is applied only to
persons with an Aboriginal ancestry and not applied to other persons of “mixed heritage”
such as English-Scot for example. It should be capitalized unless a direct quote, and
particularly when used to designate a self-naming group or persons in Western Canada.
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distribution under the Dominion Lands Act (DLA).20 Tis occurred across the
Northwest Territory, out of which the provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta
were subsequently established, as well as parts of the present Northwest Territories
and northeastern British Columbia. Tese special constitutional and legislative
provisions were designed to extinguish any Aboriginal title that may be possessed
by what the racist conceptions of the times viewed as “mixed-blood” persons.
Any “mixed-blood” person, not any mixture of European nationalities, but only
of an Aboriginal parent and a European parent, was considered eligible, without
regard to ethnic or cultural afliation.
In the result, the records show that numerous Indian treaty annuitants and
members of various First Nation communities took a legal “Half-breed” or “Métis”
identity. Te federal Indian Act excluded such persons from membership in the
federally-created “Indian bands” and created a very large population of “non-status
Indians.” Te historically recent “Métis” political movement involved many
“non-status Indians.”21 Parenthetically, that category of persons remains largely
overlooked in Aboriginal policy and also constitutes one of the complexities of
attempts at defning Métis people for various purposes.
Te distinction between the historical legal category of “mixed-blood persons”
and the Métis Nation was evident in the results of the discussions at the First
Ministers Conferences on Aboriginal Constitutional Reform (FMCs) of the 1980s,
and in the terms of the Métis Nation Accord in the Charlottetown Accord 1992:22
1. Defnitions
For the purposes of the Métis Nation and this Accord,
(a) “Métis” means an Aboriginal person who self-identifes as Métis, who is distinct
from Indian and Inuit and is a descendant of those Métis who received or were
entitled to receive land grants and/or scrip under the provisions of the Manitoba
Act, 1870, or the Dominion Lands Act, as enacted from time to time.
(b) “Métis Nation” means the community of Métis persons in subsection a) and
persons of Aboriginal descent who are accepted by that community.

First, the FMCs established that negotiations and consent are the legitimate
processes to legitimize Canada’s constitution and to make section 35 efective,

20. Manitoba Act, supra note 8, s 31.
21. See generally Ens & Sawchuk, supra note 9.
22. Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: Perspectives and Realities, vol
4 (Supply and Services Canada, 1996) at 215; Ibid at Appendix 5D at 252-53
[emphasis added] [RCAP].
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a proposition supported by subsequent jurisprudence, most of which dealt with
the relations between provinces and Canada.
Second, the Métis Nation Accord proposed two essential elements for
rationalizing the meaning of the reference to “the Métis people” in section 35.
Te frst element is the legal identifcation of the “Métis” persons who are the
descendants of those persons identifed as grantees under section 31 of the
Manitoba Act, 1870 and of the DLA in 1879 as amended.23 By way of emphasis,
the point is that the distinct culture test favoured by the courts is far removed
from the reality that the Métis “enfranchisement” or extinguishment of Indian
title process involved several cultural communities including Nehiyawuk, Dene,
Anishinaabe, and others. Te second element is the Métis “nation,” a “people”
entitled to self-determination under international law and to negotiate their
contemporary constitutional status and rights with Canada.24
As the late Métis leader, Harry Daniels, commented, “Our dreams to promote
the rights of Aboriginal peoples as ‘nations’ within Canada were dimmed by the
failure of the Charlottetown Accord.”25
C. IS A NATION A LEGAL ENTITY?

My initial and tentative proposition is that the concept of a “nation” is too uncertain
and shifting a body to be subject to legal recognition. An Aboriginal “nation,”
whether Indian, Métis, or Inuit, is an inchoate entity that has constitutional status
by virtue of the constitutional evolution of Canada. According to the federal
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP), the Aboriginal “nations” are
inchoate bodies that must organize themselves in order to participate efectively
and democratically in a process leading to the establishment of defensible state–
Indigenous relations that respect the international norm of self-determination.

II. THE RECOGNITION OF ABORIGINAL NATIONS IS AN
EXECUTIVE FUNCTION
Te Royal Proclamation of 1763, which acknowledged the existence and the
rights of the Aboriginal peoples in British North America, refers to “nations.”26

23. Ibid at 253 (Appendix 5D).
24. Ibid. Te limitation of the defnition of Métis Nation to persons “of Aboriginal descent” may
import an illegitimate racial test. A discussion of the issue is beyond the scope of this article.
25. Daniels, supra note 3 at 14.
26. Royal Proclamation, 1763 (issued by George III), reprinted in RSC 1970, Appendix II.
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Te Proclamation was an executive act which had the force of law in British
colonies at the time it was proclaimed.27
Te historic treaty relationship with the “Indian tribes” of the colonies
that became Canada were conducted and entered into by representatives of
the executive branch of government. Tis practice was continued by Canada
after 1867. Te negotiation of treaties is an exercise of the royal prerogative that
has crystallized into a constitutional convention that ought not be usurped by
appointed judges.
Modern treaties are negotiated between the executive and First Nation
representatives before execution by the executive and Treaty Nation political
representatives. Te agreements are then ratifed by the legislative arm of
government and by the people of the Aboriginal nation. Te role of the executive
in recognizing the Treaty Nations with which the state will enter into ofcial
relations is akin to its role in the recognition of foreign governments. In each case
the state is dealing with a distinct social and political entity that is not an enemy
alien. Te courts take judicial notice of the sovereign nations that have been
recognized by the executive branch of government.28
Recognition of Aboriginal “nations” has been suggested as being part of
the constitutional role of the executive branch. Te appointed judges cannot
legitimately dictate the nature and scope of the public interest of an Aboriginal
nation under the guise of interpreting the text of the Constitution. At the end
of the fnal FMC in 1987, the Prime Minister expressed disappointment that
a constitutional amendment on behalf of the Aboriginal peoples had not been
supported but also resolved that one day constitutionally entrenched guarantees
should be obtained.29
Te view that the recognition of “nations” for the purposes of negotiating
self-government agreements is the proper role of the executive is also supported
by the RCAP analysis and recommendations: “[T]he only satisfactory resolution
of contentious Aboriginal issues can be one that is negotiated between the
representatives of appropriate Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal governments.”30

27. Today a Royal Proclamation has no legal efect.
28. Duf Development Company Limited v Government of Kelantan, [1924] 1 AC 797 (HL (Eng)).
29. First Ministers’ Conference on Aboriginal Constitutional Matters, Verbatim Transcript, Doc
800-23/004 (Ottawa: 27 March 1987) at 189-90.
30. RCAP, supra note 22 at 187.
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Under the RCAP model, an Aboriginal Lands and Treaties Tribunal would
recommend to the federal Cabinet the identity of the particular “nations” with
which Canada ought to enter into constitutional negotiations.31
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATION OF CANADA TO NEGOTIATE WITH
ABORIGINAL NATIONS

Riel’s “Manitoba Treaty” of 1870 was a bargain of confederation that has been
fundamentally breached by Canada’s failure to fulfll its promises. Te de facto
rule of Canada must be legitimized by the consent of the Métis Nation. Similarly,
the consent of all the Aboriginal nations is necessary to legitimize Canada’s exercise
of constitutional authority. Te treaties have been the process of reconciling the
distinct “public interests” of Canada and of each Aboriginal nation. In MMF, the
Court stated that:32
[T]he honour of the Crown is engaged by constitutional obligations to Aboriginal
groups. Section 31 of the Manitoba Act is just such a constitutional obligation.
Section 31 conferred land rights on yet-to-be-identifed individuals—the Métis
children.33 Yet the record leaves no doubt that it was a promise made to the Métis people
collectively, in recognition of their distinct community. Te honour of the Crown is
thus engaged here.

On the facts of the case, the reference to “the Métis people collectively” refers
to the Métis families in the Red River region whose members were entitled to the
benefts of section 31.
Te promise of Canada in response to the 1869–1870 Resistance was
made to the Métis Nation in a political bargain that was negotiated by political
representatives. It was a bargain of Confederation. Te details of the bargain
included the land promises, the educational and language guarantees in sections
22–23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870 as well as an amnesty for all those who had

31. Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: Restructuring the Relationship, vol 2
(Supply and Services Canada, 1996) at 566-87.
32. Manitoba Métis Federation Inc v Canada (AG), 2013 SCC 14 at para 91 [emphasis added]
[MMF]. My view is that the meanings of the Métis lands provision and that of the courts are
irreconcilable, as is the argument of the plaintif organization that section 31 had the object
of creating a permanent land base.
33. Contra Chartand, Settlement, supra note 9. Te lands were intended for the beneft of the
families, which includes the parents or heads of families. Reason does not support the idea of
recognizing the collective Indian title and at the same time failing to provide compensation
for some but not all members of the families constituting the community that holds the title.
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participated in the defence of the Métis homelands.34 In the MMF case, the
Court said this: 35
An analogy may be drawn between such a constitutional obligation and a treaty
promise. An “intention to create obligations” and a “certain measure of solemnity”
should attach to both. … Moreover, both types of promises are made for the
overarching purpose of reconciling Aboriginal interests with the Crown’s sovereignty.
Constitutional obligations may even be arrived at after a course of consultation similar
to treaty negotiation.

Te bargain in the Manitoba Treaty was broken by Canada. Tere was no
amnesty. Te lands were not given according to the terms of section 31 of the
Manitoba Act, 1870.36 Te political resources of the Métis Nation were weakened
and scattered and nearly destroyed.37
Te Manitoba Treaty has constitutional status. Tis status is based upon its
place in the historic Crown–Métis relations. Te Manitoba Treaty encapsulates
a positive obligation of the governments of Canada and Manitoba to negotiate
the terms of the Constitution under which the members of the Métis Nation
are prepared to live. Te basic principle of the constitution at issue is consent:
Consent is the foundation for constitutional legitimacy.38 Te duty to negotiate
the terms of the Manitoba Treaty can be the subject of a judicial declaration, but
the fnal result of negotiations is not justiciable, on the basis of the principles in
the Reference re Secession of Quebec.39
Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 demands negotiations towards
reconciliation of the conficting public interests of the Métis Nation at Red
River in 1869–1870.40 Te outstanding obligation of Canada to negotiate the
unique Manitoba Treaty (the only Métis treaty) arises from a national referendum
in which the nation expresses by democratic means its wish to negotiate and
identify its representative democratic procedures.41 Like the provinces, Aboriginal
34. For accounts of the negotiations, see Chartrand, Settlement, supra note 9 at 18, n 87.
35. MMF, supra note 32 at para 71, McLachlin CJ [emphasis added].
36. See Chartrand, Settlement, supra note 9 at 138-44; DN Sprague, “Te Manitoba Land
Question, 1870–1882” (1980) 15 J Can Stud 74.
37. According to Gerald Friesen, the political power of the Métis in Manitoba had weakened
by the end of the decade. Gerald Friesen, “Homeland to Hinterland: Political Transition in
Manitoba, 1870–1879” (1979) 14 Hist Papers 33.
38. For an outline of the constitutional argument, see Paul LAH Chartrand, “Indigenous
Peoples: Negotiating Constitutional Reconciliation and Legitimacy in Canada” (2011) 19
Waikato L Rev 14.
39. [1998] 2 SCR 217.
40. Ibid at paras 16-22.
41. Ibid at para 25.
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“nations” are constituent parts of Canada. Teir consent is required to legitimize
the de facto rule of Canada and to achieve de jure constitutional status. What is
good for the provincial goose is good for the Aboriginal gander.
Canada must create an Aboriginal Lands andTreatiesTribunal, as recommended
in Volume 2 of RCAP’s fnal report of 1996. Te specially-constituted tribunal
should make recommendations to Canada and the relevant provinces on the
terms of the Métis Nation Constitution and the process for its ratifcation.

III. THE POWLEY DECISION: A SEISMIC SHIFT IN CANADA–
ABORIGINAL RELATIONS
Te mischief starts with the fact that Powley purported to usurp the historic
British-Canadian role of the executive, to recognize not only foreign governments
but also sovereign Aboriginal peoples found in their homelands by the intruding
foreigners. Tere had been no executive or legislative recognition of a people
distinct from the Treaty Nations in the local region at issue in the case.
Te Powley test involved facts in the area of Sault Ste. Marie in Ontario,
a place far removed from the historic legislative and constitutional recognition of
Métis people in Western Canada.42 In my commentary following the decision of
the Court of Appeal for Ontario, I wrote:43
Powley illustrates the general case of many of the mixed-blood inhabitants of
Canada. In my view, the application of exceptional principles to the general case
as the Ontario Court of Appeal has done will lead ultimately to an irrational and
unworkable doctrine of Aboriginal and treaty rights and produce inequitable results
for all the Aboriginal peoples mentioned in section 35. In addition, applying
exceptional principles to the unexceptional presence of mixed-blood individuals
and families also risks introducing arguments into the section 35 context that will
be based on racial rather than rational grounds.

Powley has been followed uncritically in subsequent cases by both lower
courts and the Court itself.
Powley was a case involving a defence to a prosecution for an ofence against
a provincial statute. Neither the Métis Nation nor a Métis community were
parties in the case. Nothing said by a Canadian court in such circumstances can
have an efect on the unrepresented rights of the nation or the people. Te law

42. Powley, supra note 5.
43. Paul LAH Chartrand, “Te Hard Case of Defning ‘Te Métis People’ and Teir Rights:
A Comment on R. v. Powley” (2003) 12 Const Forum 84.
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that was decided in the case cannot apply to the rights of parties that were not
represented in court.
Powley is at best a precedent limited to small Aboriginal communities making
section 35 Aboriginal rights claims, subject to the criticism below. Te case has
no authoritative weight in respect to the constitutional status of the Métis Nation
or indeed to any other Aboriginal nation. Te better view is that Powley was
decided per incuriam or alternatively that it was wrongly decided.
Te current judicial approach, founded upon the Powley decision, is bound
to produce injustice, confusion, and uncertainty in the law. Tis contrasts
sharply with the judicial role of creating certainty in the law as demanded by the
precept of the rule of law. My analysis applies to all the Aboriginal peoples in the
Constitution and seeks to do equal justice to all of them.
A. POWLEY ADOPTS A RACIST MEANING OF “MÉTIS”

Te experts and the judges both took the view that a racist conception of
community identity was defensible and appropriate. Te notion that a
“mixed-blood” community is a “Métis” community appears to be based upon
the nineteenth-century, racist view that resulted in the “Half-breed” policy for
extinguishing Indian title. Te policy was incoherent and never worked. Many
“Indians” recognized by the federal Indian Act that administers Indian reserves
are “mixed-blood” people. At the time the treaties were executed, “mixed-blood”
people were accepted by the government of Canada as “Indians” if they belonged
to a community that entered into a treaty.44 First Nations have always included
members who have various ancestral identities.
In the following paragraphs, the Court in Powley clearly asserts that there
exists in fact or in theory a large racial group of “mixed-blood” people, without
explaining why that matters. Implicitly the Court is stating that some Métis
communities will have emerged out of a larger pool of “mixed-blood” populations:45
Te term “Métis” in s. 35 does not encompass all individuals with mixed Indian and
European heritage; rather, it refers to distinctive peoples who, in addition to their
mixed ancestry, developed their own customs, way of life, and recognizable group
identity separate from their Indian or Inuit and European forebears.

44. See Ens & Sawchuk, supra note 9, ch 8; Canada, Privy Council Ofce, Report of Mr. Justice
WA Macdonald Following an Enquiry Directed Under Section 18 of the Indian Act (King’s
Printer, 1944) (Chair: William Alexander MacDonald).
45. Powley, supra note 5 at paras 10-11.
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Te Métis of Canada share the common experience of having forged a new culture
and a distinctive group identity from their Indian or Inuit and European roots. Tis
enables us to speak in general terms of “the Métis”.

Further, the Court did not consider the law that “blood” or “race” is too
uncertain a criterion to have legal meaning.46
In obiter, the Court then stated that many have encouraged the explosion of
self-identifying “Métis” persons and communities in central and eastern Canada
where history had not recorded stories of Crown–Métis relations:47
However, particularly given the vast territory of what is now Canada, we should
not be surprised to fnd that diferent groups of Métis exhibit their own distinctive
traits and traditions. Tis diversity among groups of Métis may enable us to speak
of Métis “peoples”, a possibility left open by the language of s. 35(2), which speaks
of the “Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada.”

What does the Court mean? What facts are contemplated? Whatever the
intended meaning, it is the ordinary rules of grammar which require the plural
“peoples” after the last element of the list. Tus was invented the notion that
there exist “mixed-blood” communities across Canada within the meaning of
section 35. In the Court’s view, which is not part of the reasons for the decision,
any previously unrecognized community of “mixed-blood” people, but only of
mixed Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal “blood,” may claim Métis rights. Tis
racist view is unequivocally rejected.
Te Court continued:48
We would not purport to enumerate the various Métis peoples that may exist.
Because the Métis are explicitly included in s. 35, it is only necessary for our
purposes to verify that the claimants belong to an identifable Métis community with
a sufcient degree of continuity and stability to support a site-specifc aboriginal right.
A Métis community can be defned as a group of Métis with a distinctive collective
identity, living together in the same geographic area and sharing a common way of
life. Te respondents here claim membership in the Métis community centred in
and around Sault Ste. Marie.

As I predicted, the creation of distinct tests for proof of “Métis” rights give
rise to new challenges for First Nation claimants. For example, in New Brunswick,
the distinction between the Micmac “nation” and smaller Micmac communities
seems to refect the Powley approach, presaged by the approach in Kruger, that

46. Noble et al v Alley, [1951] SCR 64 at 70.
47. Powley, supra note 5 at para 11.
48. Ibid at para 12 [emphasis added].
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was previously used to identify section 35 rights-bearing communities as small
local communities, on the facts of particular cases.
In previous cases, the courts had decided that the relevant practice, custom,
or tradition had to be shown to have historical continuity in a contemporary
rights-bearing community. In Bernard, the New Brunswick Court of Appeal
decided that, as in Powley, continuity between the historic community and the
present cultural and geographical community itself had to be proved—a much
more onerous test, particularly where it is necessary to know the movements of
specifc communities over the past several centuries.49
B. PURPORTING TO ALTER ABORIGINAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE

As previously mentioned, in a number of cases the courts had begun to create
tests to describe or defne the existing Aboriginal rights that are recognized and
afrmed by section 35. In these cases the issue whether the parties were members
of an “Aboriginal people” for the purposes of section 35 did not arise since they
were usually brought by persons or communities who had been historically
recognized by the executive government and had their Aboriginal identity
afrmed in legislation.
According to the Court in Powley, there existed a Métis community around
the city of Sault Ste. Marie which had not been noticed by the local residents
and had no history of Crown–Aboriginal relations. Tis Métis community was
not the object of the historic constitutional and legislative provisions that had
been designed for the “mixed-blood” people in the West. Nevertheless, according
to the Court, this was a “Métis” community whose rights were afrmed and
recognized in section 35.
Furthermore, the Court decided that a special test was needed to afrm and
recognize this judicially-discovered community. Te Court developed, without
citing any authoritative sources, a new and unprecedented ten-point test for
proof of a section 35 right by a Métis claimant:50
For the reasons elaborated below, we uphold the basic elements of the Van der Peet
test … and apply these to the respondents’ claim. However, we modify certain
elements of the pre-contact test to refect the distinctive history and post-contact
ethnogenesis of the Métis, and the resulting diferences between Indian claims and
Métis claims.

49. Bernard, supra note 14 at paras 42-64.
50. Powley, supra note 5 at para 14.
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Based upon the belief, inspired presumably by the opinions of the experts,
that the Métis people were “mixed-blood” people who could not have existed
before European contact, the judges decided to create a new date for proof of
section 35 Aboriginal rights. Te new date based on “administrative control”
has created a test that gives a signifcant advantage over the more rigorous test of
“contact” which applies to First Nations. Tis is not fair. It is not warranted by
the constitution, nor by law, nor by reason.51

IV. DOCTRINAL CHANGE TOWARDS REASON, FAIRNESS
AND SIMPLICITY
Tis part briefy explains two basic problems exposed by Powley. First is the unfair
later date adopted for proof of Métis rights compared to Indian and Inuit rights,
and second is the unwarranted requirement that an Aboriginal rights claimant
community plead its internal political identity as part of a judicial test for proof
of constitutional rights. Both problems result from the failure to adopt one date
for proof of all categories of Aboriginal rights.
A. DATE FOR PROOF OF ABORIGINAL RIGHTS

Te current jurisprudence in Canada includes three diferent dates for proof
of three diferent categories of Aboriginal rights that are recognized and
afrmed in section 35.
Te date for proof of Aboriginal rights that fow from historic practices,
customs, or traditions is the date of frst European contact. Te date for proof of
Aboriginal title, a second category of Aboriginal rights, is the date of the assertion
of European sovereignty.
Tese dates are difcult to rationalize if the view is taken that Aboriginal rights
must arise upon the imposition of a new legal order upon Aboriginal territories.
It is suggested that this particular date represents also the crystallization of the
fduciary relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples. If “ab-original”
people have been here since “the beginning,” as the term tells us, then Aboriginal
rights must arise at the imposition of the new constitutional order.
In Powley, the Court invented a third date for Métis people in section 35,
on the mistaken view that Métis people are essentially communities of persons who
51. In some circumstances, a Treaty Nation community has a right to determine who belongs
to the community for the purpose of exercising its treaty rights. See e.g. R v Meshake, 2007
ONCA 337; R v Shipman, 2007 ONCA 338.
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have mixed Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal ancestry, the so-called “mixed-blood”
racial myth. Te Court called this new date the date of “efective control”:52
Tis unique history can most appropriately be accommodated by a post-contact
but pre-control test that identifes the time when Europeans efectively established
political and legal control in a particular area. Te focus should be on the period
after a particular Métis community arose and before it came under the efective
control of European laws and customs. Tis pre-control test enables us to identify
those practices, customs and traditions that predate the imposition of European
laws and customs on the Métis.

If Aboriginal rights recognize and afrm the rules of social or property
relations in an Aboriginal society in Canadian law, then those Aboriginal rights
cannot arise at a date prior to the imposition of the English or Canadian legal
system.53 Tere are two distinct legal orders which organize social relations within
each society. Te recognition of Aboriginal rights involves the transformation
of social relations and their governing rules or laws from the Aboriginal society
into legal relations that are recognized in the English-Canadian constitutional
and legal system.54 Tis view seems to accord with the view of the 7–2 majority
decision in Van der Peet where it was stated:55
To base aboriginal title in traditional laws and customs, as was done in Mabo, is,
therefore, to base that title in the pre-existing societies of aboriginal peoples. Tis is the
same basis as that asserted here for aboriginal rights.

Te current three diferent dates for proof of diferent types of Aboriginal rights
must be replaced by one date for all. Te correct date is the date of the imposition
of the English system on the Aboriginal societies, the exchange of protection for
allegiance,56 and the date at which the fduciary relationship crystallized.57
52. Powley, supra note 5 at para 37 [emphasis added].
53. For the classic discussion of this issue, see JC Smith, “Te Concept of Native Title” (1974)
24 UTLJ 1; see also Brian Slattery, “Te Generative Structure of Aboriginal Rights” (2007)
38 SCLR (2d) 595 [Slattery, “Generative Structure”].
54. See generally Jennifer Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Teory of Self, Autonomy, and
Law (Oxford University Press, 2011).
55. Van der Peet, supra note 11 at para 40 [emphasis added].
56. Albert Peeling & Paul LAH Chartrand, “Sovereignty, Liberty, and the Legal Order of the
‘Freemen’ (Otipahemsu’uk): Towards a Constitutional Teory of Métis Self-Government”
(2004) 67 Sask L Rev 339 (see the discussion and references to the case law therein and see
especially page 343).
57. See Slattery, “Making Sense,” supra note 12 at 218; Slattery, “Generative Structure,”
supra note 53. See also Van der Peet, supra note 11 (see the separate dissenting reasons of
McLachlin CJ and L’Heureux-Dubé J).
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As emphasized by then Chief Justice Lamer in Delgamuukw, the Aboriginal
peoples included under section 35 are the communities that existed and lived
in the Aboriginal territories at the time that the English-Canadian system was
imposed upon a particular region.58 Te existence of the Métis people in the
West is the result of the fact that British-Canadian imperialism was established
a very long time after its initial introduction by the French and English regimes
in regions further east. Naturally, by that time, many Aboriginal persons were
“mixed-blood.” And naturally, that fact did contribute to the emergence of a
nationalism amongst some communities united by geography, economics,
and kinship that was distinguishable from both the particular Aboriginal
and European ancestors. It is not helpful to reduce this complexity to a racist
“mixed-blood” myth.59 It is noteworthy that although the Court left open the
matter of identifying “the Métis people” in section 35, nevertheless, subsequent
decisions have, without explanation, presumed to apply the Powley test uncritically
to other facts and other places.
An unfair result of Powley’s new date for proof is that “mixed-blood”
communities would have a signifcant advantage over Treaty Nation communities
to prove Aboriginal rights. Te advantage arises from a much later date for proof.
Brian Slattery provides the following example:60
Take the case of two modern Aboriginal groups—one Metis, the other Indian—
that live side by side in a certain area. Te groups have common ancestors on the
indigenous side; they are both the descendants of an Indian nation that occupied the
area when Europeans frst arrived. By the time the Crown gained efective control
over the area, a Metis61 community had grown up alongside the Indian one, and
both groups had become heavily involved in the commercial fur trade – something
absent from the culture of their Indian forefathers at the time of contact. Under the
Powley test the Metis group would gain an aboriginal right to trade in furs, while
under the Van der Peet test the Indian group would not. For the rights of the Metis
would be ascertained by reference to their practices at the time of efective control,
while the rights of their Indian neighbours would be determined by their practices
at the time of contact. Te result, needless to say, is paradoxical. Te group of mixed

58. See Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 at para 144 [Delgamuukw].
59. Te debate about the signifcance of “race” is also a signifcant aspect of American
jurisprudence and debate on the identifcation of Indian tribes which are regarded as distinct
political entities. See e.g. Gregory Ablavsky, “‘With the Indian Tribes’: Race, Citizenship and
Original Constitutional Meanings” (2018) 70 Stan L Rev 1025; Carole Goldberg-Ambrose,
“Not ‘Strictly’ Racial: A Response to ‘Indians as Peoples’” (1991) 39 UCLA L Rev 169.
60. Slattery, “Generative Structure,” supra note 53 at 621-22.
61. I understand this reference to be to a “mixed-blood” community, in accordance with the view
adopted by the court.
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aboriginal-European descent is credited with an Aboriginal right that is denied to
their Indian neighbours,62 despite the fact that both groups were engaged in the fur
trade at the time of efective control, and both are descendants of an Indian nation
that did not trade in furs at the time of contact.

Tese results alone ought to be sufcient to doubt the “reasonableness,” the
foundation of common law analysis, of the Powley decision.63
B. THE “AB-ORIGINAL DATE” OR THE “DATE OF RECONCILIATION”

Te Van der Peet test must be modifed in respect to the date for proof of the
rights of all Aboriginal peoples, but not for the Powley reasons.
Aboriginal rights originate at the time and the place the British-Canadian
legal system is imposed. Te “Ab-original” peoples are the peoples who were there
at “the Aboriginal time” and whose allegiance was exchanged for protection. Te
Aboriginal date is the date at which the fduciary relationship crystallized. Te
date is determined by the historical time at which the British legal order was
established, that is, the date at which the Crown’s protection was made available
in exchange for the new allegiance to the Crown. As then Chief Justice Cockburn
stated in R v Keyn, “protection and allegiance are correlative: it is only where
protection is aforded by the law that the obligation of allegiances arises.”64
Te Aboriginal date may also be thought of as the “date of reconciliation”
for the reason that it is at the date of the imposition of the new legal order that
conficting public interests have to be reconciled.
It is suggested that the “Métis” persons that the Court conceived as a
particular community of the “mixed-blood” persons that were presumed to
exist across Canada may be members of Aboriginal rights-bearing communities
identifed by the Van der Peet test as modifed by the argument in this article,
which argues for one date for proof of any and all section 35 “Aboriginal rights.”

62. In the usual case they are also their relatives.
63. It is outside the scope of this article to demonstrate that the tests for proof of Aboriginal
rights are also unfair in comparison with the tests developed by the common law courts for
proof of local customary law in Britain and in its colonial Empire. For further discussion,
see Paul LAH Chartrand, “Defning the Métis of Canada: A Principled Approach to
Crown-Aboriginal Relations” in Frederica Wilson & Melanie Mallet, eds, Métis-Crown
Relations: Rights, Identity, Jurisdiction, and Governance (Irwin Law, 2008) 27.
64. R v Keyn (1876), 2 Ex D 63 at 236, citing Calvin’s Case (1608), 7 Co Rep 1.
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C. SELF-NAMING PRACTICES ARE IRRELEVANT FOR PURPOSES OF
PROVING ABORIGINAL RIGHTS

If there is one test and one date for proof of Aboriginal rights, then any supposed
reason to identify a claimant community as falling within the concept of an
“Indian” or “Métis” or “Inuit” group disappears.
A section 35 Aboriginal community with Aboriginal rights is any community
that existed in a particular place at the “Aboriginal date.” As was said by the Court
in Daniels: Tey are all section 91(24) “Indians.”65 Tey are also all Aboriginal
communities within section 35 because they lived in a specifc place at the
relevant time: Te “Aboriginal date.”
In recent cases, judges have been deciding that the choice of political
representatives of an Aboriginal rights-bearing community is a matter for the
exercise of internal decision making by the community. It is not a subject-matter
within judicial authority to determine. Tis judicial development is an important
recognition that not all matters relating to social and political aspects of a section
35 Aboriginal community are justiciable.
Self-naming practices fall into the same category of political and social matters
that are purely internal to the section 35 Aboriginal community. Te name by
which a community wishes to be known is not a part of the test for proof of
Aboriginal rights. An Aboriginal community claiming an Aboriginal right in court
is not required to tell the judges about its self-naming preferences chosen from
Canada’s illustrative list of named groups, Inuit, Indian, or Métis. Furthermore,
the norm of self-determination requires respect and acknowledgement by the
courts for the proposition that a people is free to call itself by its preferred name.
In efect, the addition of the term “Métis” to the open-ended list in section
35 does not alter the point that section 35 recognizes and afrms the rights of all
the Aboriginal peoples, regardless of self-naming practices and regardless of the
labels attached to them by outsiders.66
65. Daniels v Canada (Indian Afairs and Northern Development), 2016 SCC 12 at para 46
[Daniels]. Te “Indian” is a fction invented by the intruders to North America. Te term
acquired constitutional status in the Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3,
s 91(24), reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5. It acquired legal status in the Indian Act,
RSC 1985, c I-5. Te “Indian” fction has been adopted for various purposes by some of the
Ab-original inhabitants, which is their prerogative. In the United States, there are federally
recognized “Indian tribes.” In Canada the term “First Nations” has recently replaced the term
“Indians” in general references.
66. For an example of an analysis involving outsider-labeling of Aboriginal peoples, see Reference
as to whether “Indians” includes in Head 24 of Section 91 of the British North America Act,
1867, Includes Eskimo Inhabitants of the Province of Quebec, [1939] SCR 104.
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Te same result would apply if section 35 made no reference to the Métis
people. Harry Daniels convinced Prime Minister Chrétien to insert the term
for greater certainty to deal with the concern that persons and communities
that were not recognized in the federal Indian Act would be included. Daniels
also took the view that the Native Council of Canada included all “non-status
Indians” who were its constituents at that time in its understanding of the term
“Métis.” Tis view is another example of the political adoption of a model of civic
nationalism amongst Aboriginal organisations, as previously noted in the case of
the Métis National Council.
It does not matter whether persons or communities are characterized as
Métis or as “non-status Indians” for section 35 purposes. Tey are all “non-status
Indians” because they do not have the legal status conferred by the Indian Act.
But they are Aboriginal people within the meaning of section 35 if they meet the
tests established for proof of Aboriginal rights.

